This episode explores the story of Adnan Syed, who may or may not have been wrongly convicted in 1999 of killing Hae Min Lee, Syed's ex-girlfriend who was a senior at Baltimore County's Woodlawn High School. She disappeared in January 1999. Serial's investigative team "follows up on long-dormant leads, rechecks alibis, and questions assumptions."[24] Host Sarah Koenig reveals that the story is in process and that she doesn't know how it will end
Adnan Syed and Hae Min Lee had a storybook romance, kept secret from their disapproving parents. When Lee broke it off, their friends had conflicting interpretations of Syed's behavior: he was either cool with it and sad, or in a rage and hatching a sinister plot to kill her. Syed consistently proclaims his innocence, but there are puzzling inconsistencies in the set of facts he tells.
Lee had been missing for three weeks when a man on his lunch break, referred to as "Mr. S", discovered her body. His account of how he found her body seems suspicious to detectives MacGillivary and Ritz, who questioned him, and his background check reveals some bizarre behaviors, including a series of streaking episodes.
An anonymous caller leads detectives to subpoena Adnan Syed's cell phone records. As a result, the detectives discover calls to Jen, who is a friend of one of Adnan's acquaintances, a weed dealer named Jay. Detectives interview Jen and then Jay, who says Syed told him he killed Lee, and then forced him to help bury her body. Details of Jay's story shifted in some significant ways over four interviews, but the detectives said they were able to corroborate his story using cell phone records.
Producers Koenig and Chivvis test drive the prosecution's route and timeline of Lee's murder between 2:15, when school let out at the high school, and 2:36, when Jay said Syed called him for pick up in the Best Buy parking lot and then showed Jay Lee's body in the trunk of her car. While that timeline seems possible, though just barely, evidence from the call logs and records of cell tower pings do not quite align with Jay's testimony about the rest of the afternoon.
In addition to Jay's testimony, evidence against Adnan Syed included a palm print on a map that could not be dated, and cell phone records. Did Syed ask Lee for a ride after school to get into her car? Koenig goes through all the evidence, including the prosecution's timeline and "some stray things" that don't add up, including a neighbor's story, the testimony of Jay's friend Jen, and the sequence of cell phone calls after Lee disappeared.
Deirdre Enright, Director of Investigation for the Innocence Project at the University of Virginia School of Law,[27] and a team of law students analyze the case against Adnan Syed. Deirdre thinks the evidence against him was "thin". She advises Koenig to keep revisiting all the evidence, allowing uncertainties to remain until there is a tipping point when her questions are resolved. They start with a presumption of Syed's innocence, and ask whether they can discover who really did kill Lee. They find some undeveloped forensic evidence, but Koenig is still uncertain.
How credible was Jay's story? Koenig interviews a jury member, who said Jay seemed like a nice young man and believable. A professional detective says the investigation of Lee's murder was better than average, and Jay had handed the police the case on a platter. Koenig and Snyder visit Jay, who declines an interview. Jay's friend Chris recalls what Jay told him about the murder, a story not consistent with Jay's courtroom version. Why did Jay agree to help Syed? Did Syed coerce Jay and threaten to hurt Jay's girlfriend Stephanie? His friends said Jay had a reputation for lying, but not about important things. Jay's friend Jen says she could understand why Jay might lie about some details, but she believed his story. Back to the question: what was the jury thinking?
Koenig reveals she has new information about the call at 2:36. First, Laura claims there were never any pay phones in front of the Best Buy, but Jay's drawing shows a phone booth in front of the Best Buy, and he claimed Syed was standing by that phone booth with red gloves on. Second, Lee's friend Summer says that Lee could not have been dead by 2:36, because she had a conversation with Lee between 2:30 and 2:45. Others also saw Lee after school that day. Third, Asia saw Syed at the library in that same time frame. Sarah Koenig explores Syed's perspective as he was questioned, arrested, tried, and sentenced, as well as his letters to friends about life in prison. She mentions that she has reasonable doubt, not in the legal sense, but in the "normal person" sense.
Did anti-Muslim sentiment affect the prosecution? The prosecution argued that Syed's community would help him flee to Pakistan if bail were granted, using stereotypes to make the case that Syed murdered Lee as an honor killing. Defense attorney Cristina Gutierrez argued that someone else did it, and police did not look beyond Syed. His first trial ended in a mistrial, and in the second trial she cast suspicion on Mr. S and Jay as involved in the crime, but she did not present a clear outline of these arguments or scrutinize discrepancies in the call log timeline. Gutierrez discovered the prosecutor had secured an attorney for Jay – arguably a "benefit" worth money – in connection with his pleading guilty as an accessory and agreeing to testify, but the judge did not agree that this tainted Jay's testimony. Koenig does not believe Cristina Gutierrez intentionally bungled his defense, but within a year after Syed's trial, Gutierrez became very ill, her career collapsed, and she was disbarred. Syed has a petition before a higher court which requires a response by January 14, 2015, on the narrow issue of inadequate defense of counsel based on Gutierrez not seeking a plea bargain, which Syed claims he had asked her to do. Because Syed has maintained his innocence, however, and therefore shows no remorse, he is unlikely to be paroled.
Koenig investigates negative rumors about Syed, though the rumors do not directly connect him to Lee's murder, and the most troubling rumors cannot be substantiated. People from his mosque were scared when he was arrested, some describing his story as a cautionary tale. Some believe Syed was duplicitous, capable of committing the crime. One rumor, that he stole money from the mosque, was partially confirmed by four people. Syed admitted taking some money when he was in eighth grade, but his mother found out, and he felt ashamed. Syed had a reputation as a peacemaker, "a good guy", helpful and caring. People who knew him in high school cannot believe he planned Lee's murder. Did Syed "lose it", and nurse feelings of rejection? Could Syed have committed murder in a dissociative state, not knowing he did it? Koenig explores whether Syed has true empathy or anti-social characteristics, and consults with psychologist Charles Ewing, who has interviewed many young murderers. Why does Syed not sound more angry about Jay or other people connected to his case? In an 18-page letter to Koenig, Syed reveals his concern about being perceived as manipulative, and says it doesn't matter how the podcast portrays him.
After spending over a year researching the case, Koenig still is uncertain what happened the day that Lee disappeared. She reveals new information that happened as a result of people hearing about the podcast: she has spoken with Don, Lee's boyfriend of 13 days at the time of her disappearance, and with Jay's former co-worker, Josh. Koenig reviews the phone records again with her production team and determines that neither Jay's nor Syed's story of that day aligns with the evidence. Unresolved discrepancies also include Jen and Jay's stories about how they disposed of Jay's clothes and boots. Reviewing possible motives for the murder, Koenig and her producers reason that logically, if Syed is innocent, he had extraordinarily bad luck because of circumstantial evidence involving him. Lawyers from the Innocence Project announce they will seek court approval to test the DNA found on Lee's body and a bottle found nearby, possibly pointing to another man, and Syed's petition in the court of appeals is still alive. Koenig expresses her desire to avoid unsubstantiated speculation and to focus on only the facts. She concludes that from a legal perspective, she would have voted to acquit Syed, although she still nurses doubts.
It’s Baltimore, 2022. Adnan Syed has spent the last 23 years incarcerated, serving a life sentence for the murder of Hae Min Lee, a crime he says he didn’t commit. He has exhausted every legal avenue for relief, including a petition to the United States Supreme Court. But then, a prosecutor in the Baltimore State’s Attorney’s office stumbled upon two handwritten notes in Adnan’s case file, and that changes everything.
Private Bowe Bergdahl left his Army post in Afghanistan in 2009, intending to hike about 20 miles to a larger command center and trigger a "DUSTWUN" manhunt. In telephone conversations with Mark Boal, a documentary film maker, Bergdahl said he wanted to report poor leadership at his post and air grievances, but enemy fighters captured him within hours of his disappearance. Sarah Koenig will be using more of the 25 hours of recorded conversations between Bergdahl and Boal to tell his story.
The capture of Bowe Bergdahl is recounted by Taliban members present that day and the weeks following. Other US Army soldiers discuss the initial recovery efforts and their feelings about Bergdahl following his disappearance.
Bergdahl said he tried to escape after he was captured, but his first attempt only resulted in about 15 minutes of freedom. He was chained spread-eagle to a bed and blindfolded for about three months. His next escape lasted only eight days, during which he was injured falling off a cliff in the dark. He remained in captivity until Special Forces picked him up in 2014.
What was going on with the captors? Bergdahl's description of his captors is confusing, largely because his perspective was from inside a cage, inside a locked room. Koenig interviews David Rohde, another American held captive by the Haqqani network for about seven months, who had been abducted with two Afghan colleagues who could interpret what his captors were saying and doing.
In 2009, the search for Bergdahl was in hands of two low-level personnel recovery intel analysts for Afghanistan, at CENTCOM in Tampa, not a division in-theater. Hostage recovery was not at the top of list of priorities for the CIA, NSA, or other intelligence agencies, and resources were consequently not available. Because Bergdahl was held in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, there were also complicated diplomatic issues. In 2013, General John Campbell made it a top priority to recover Bergdahl, and Colonel Jason Amerine audited everything done in Bergdahl's case and in other hostage cases. Agencies such as CENTCOM, SOCOM, DOD, and the State Department seemed to hand off responsibility for recovering not just Bergdahl, but other American hostages as well, making a dysfunctional hostage recovery policy. Koenig observes that frustration was the central theme expressed by those she interviewed, who were struggling against competing interests and limits on what the U.S. is willing risk to get hostages back.
Sgt. Bergdahl gave a 380-page statement to Gen. Kenneth Dahl, telling the story of his deployment and what happened when he walked away from his post. Bergdahl had been a good infantry soldier up until that point, who even volunteered for extra duty, a "squared away" soldier. He had become disillusioned at his first post in Alaska after basic training, and found Army leadership to be lacking. The mission in Afghanistan was counterinsurgency and nation-building, but many soldiers expressed confusion over doing "humanitarian things," rather than seeking and destroying the Taliban enemy. Bergdahl wanted adventure and action, and was disappointed in his platoon's work. The platoon was assigned a rescue mission, but they were attacked on their return, in a firefight through a ravine, eventually limping back to the post with no losses, but they were upbraided for not shaving for six days. Bergdahl was angry about the battalion commander's misplaced priorities. Bergdahl wanted to "kill the bad guys", and do better at engaging the regular Afghans, but he felt the Army was not fulfilling its counter-insurgency mission. When the battalion was assigned to dig trenches near Moest in 110-degree heat of summer, the battalion commander aggressively berated them for being out of uniform, as a breakdown in discipline. Bergdahl was offended by the punishment, feeling the commander was incompetent, and out of control. He felt he had to cause a DUSTWUN to correct the situation. So was he selfish, or selfless?
Has Bergdahl been telling the truth about his reasons for walking off base in Afghanistan, or just the version he could live with? Berdahl says he left because army leaders were dangerously bad. Genreal Dahl concluded Bergdahl’s comments were truthful, that his motive was well-meaning, but based on incorrect assumptions. Mark Boal said Bergdahl's conclusions would make sense only to himself. Kayla Harrison described him as an unusual, smart, creative teenager, who forged his own strict, uncompromising moral code, who believed if you know something to be wrong in the world, you must take actions to correct it, and he was "impossibly unrealistic". He had romantic expectations, a rigid code of conduct, and a judgmental perspective. He joined the Coast Guard in January 2006, at age 19. Overwhelmed, he had been hospitalized after a panic attack, and a psychologist had assessed his "mental state significant for situational anxiety", recommending discharge with "diagnosis: adjustment disorder with depression". Bergdahl felt he was being judged by his family as a failure, a black sheep who wouldn't do the right thing. In May 2008, to get a waiver to join the Army, he submitted a medical discharge statement that left out his panic attack, hospitalization, and the doctor's note that before re-enlisting in the military, he needed clearance by a psychiatrist. He didn't tell anyone at home he was joining the Army. He just turned up one day in uniform. Kim Harrison said it was the worst idea ever. Koenig asks,"Should the Army have let Bowe in?”
Did the Army screw up by accepting Bergdahl after his breakdown in Coast Guard basic training two years earlier? Dr. Elspeth Cameron Ritchie thought the Army waiver was not uncommon because information-sharing among different military branches is incomplete. Dr. Michael Valdevenos thought the Army recruiter should have scrutinized Bergdahl's record more thoroughly. Gen. Dahl concluded the recruiter had followed all procedures, but should have included review of his separation action. Mark Boal observed Bergdahl experienced the disillusion of someone who believes in the Army, who just wanted to talk to higher-ranking people in the military about improving command leadership. Bergdahl wanted to be the ideal soldier who fights for a cause he is committed to, who rallies behind trusted military leaders, with a code of honor, loyalty, and self-sacrifice. Bergdahl knew his expectations were unrealistic, but he still defended his vision of the way things should be. Bergdahl's June 27 broadcast e-mail to friends, "Who is John Gault?" referred to the industrialist in Atlas Shrugged, who shut down the world's economy in order to fix it. Dr. Christopher Lang diagnosed Bergdahl as having Schizotypal personality disorder. Dr. Valdevenos concurs that this diagnosis is accurate, describing people who are loners, lack close friends, with perceptual alterations and persistent social anxiety. Bergdahl's paranoia was worse under stress — he believed his commander might send them into a suicide operation. Koenig says this diagnosis makes his story more credible. His judgments about the commander may even be true, that American lives were put at risk to retrieve equipment. For Bergdahl, walking off base was not an an absolute boundary, but it was not a rational thing to do. Maj. Margaret Kurtz, the court martial prosecutor, said at the time of his alleged misconduct, Bergdahl was able to appreciate the nature and quality and wrongfulness of his conduct. In other words, mental illness
The U.S. State Department engaged in secret peace negotiations in Munich in 2010 with the Taliban that included a "confidence building" condition: trade Bergdahl for two prisoners at Guantanamo. But negotiator Richard Holbrook died before political reconciliation could be achieved. There was a brief hopeful moment with new negotiator Mark Grossman, but then there was stagnation for months, and no progress seemed possible. In May 2011, the Taliban walked away from the talks. Then their demands escalated to include release of five GItmo prisoners, including Mullah Faisal. Setbacks included leaks, bad timing, and "old fashioned screw-ups", including the 2011 assassination of former Afghan president Rabbani. In June 2013 a new Taliban office opened with the flag of the Islamic Emirate, in violation of the agreement with Karzai and U.S. representative James Dobbins. The word "emirate" was also on the wall of the building, which infuriated Karzai. The Taliban withdrew from peace talks, and Bergdahl stayed in captivity for another year. The Pakistani army was gearing up to bomb Pakistani Taliban in Waziristan, and the U.S. had begun withdrawing troops, so prospects for Bergdahl's release were diminishing. Bergdahl's physical condition was deteriorating. U.S. officials, including Chuck Hagel, negotiated through Qatar, finally negotiating a deal for Bergdahl's release in exchange for the five Taliban prisoners at Guantanamo. On Saturday, May 31, 2014, word finally came that Bergdahl was safe and the trade could proceed. It was a transaction, not part of a larger peace negotiation. The Bergdahls had been assured that their son would not face charges, that his time with the Taliban was punishment enough, so they thought it was over, mission accomplished. Not quite.
When Koenig questions people about what bothers them about Bergdahl's case, most say that it has become so political. Was it inevitable that it became so combative? Susan Rice characterized his service with "honor and distinction", which angered the military. Soldiers in his platoon said he walked away, and some from his unit started a "He's not a hero" Facebook page. Fox News interviewed soldiers from Bergdahl's platoon and the story became a juggernaut, with bogus intel from a discredited source even saying Bergdahl had become a Muslim and wanted to be a warrior for Islam. The political right was using the story and the platoon for political purposes, trying to bait President Obama because they had been offended by the Rose Garden ceremony, which they characterized as "a tone-deaf move" on the part of the White House. The President did not recognize the irregularities of Bergdahl's story of or questions about his disappearance, and there was no attempt to get to the bottom of the story. Why did the White House make such a mistake, instead of using an earlier plan to have a quiet event? In retrospect, it was important for the President to own the decision and explain the policy behind it. By law, Congress must be given 30-day notice before Guantanamo detainees are released, but the Department of Defense had taken the lead on the trade, and had not told Congress anything. Leaks could have derailed the fragile deal, jeopardizing Bergdahl's life. Congressional staffers felt they could no longer believe anything from DOD: first, where there had been a collegial relationship before, there was now "unprecedented, profound concern about national security risk…" Second, who signed off on the trade of five Taliban? Third, were they safe to release from Gitmo? The public anger at Bergdahl is personal, wrapped in larger questions about negotiating with terrorists. As a result of this anger, the Republican congress changed the legal wording on Gitmo foreign transfer language
Questions remain about Bergdahl's case. First, people with him during Coast Guard boot camp did not understand how could have enlisted in the Army, given their graphic recollections of his breakdown, which was not a "garden variety panic attack". Gen. Kenneth Dahl wrote that Bergdahl's Coast Guard separation should have been examined more closely. Koenig summarizes: the Army messed up, Bergdahl messed up walking off base, and then there were 5 years with the Taliban. But that leaves out the reckoning desired by the military. They want an accounting. What was Bergdahl's fault, and what was not? Gen. Michael Flynn, formerly head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, says authoritatively people died on missions to find Bergdahl. But the evidence is not so clear, in spite of the six names from the 501st battalion on missions to find DUSTWUN that have been cited in the media. Other soldiers in his unit were convinced that finding Bergdahl was part of all their missions following his disappearance, so the six deaths were connected to Bergdahl. Some cited resources dedicated to finding him that were not then available to other operations. Sgt. Maj. Ken Wolfe, however, advised looking "at a map and a timeframe", meaning after 45+ days, Bergdahl was in Pakistan. No infantry unit would be deployed to look for Bergdahl, as it would have required special forces. But what about second- and third-order consequences of his desertion? Wolfe dispels these arguments as "speculation and hypothetical". Perhaps the mission to find Bergdahl was just top cover to justify other unrelated missions the Army units needed to accomplish, as an excuse to gain assets and permission to "get outside the wire". Flynn points out they did not have bullet-proof intelligence on where Bergdahl was. But resources were diverted and people were injured and suffered because of looking for Bergdahl. Who is to blame for variables causing the deaths and injuries in wars? The country signed up for all the things a
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A teenager decides to cooperate.
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Maybe you have an idea in your head about what it was like to work at Guantanamo, one of the most notorious prisons in the world. Think again.
In 2002, an elite interrogation team secretly staged Guantanamo's most elaborate intel operations - to try to get a single detainee to talk.
An Arabic-speaking airman is sent to Guantanamo to translate, and soon finds himself at the center of a major scandal. Part 1: Suspicion swallows evidence.
The case against a young airman gets even weirder when the government pulls in two fresh investigators. Part 2: A bride, an FBI agent, and a polygraph machine.
A new warden comes to Guantanamo and decides to make some changes. A prison's a prison, he thinks. How hard could it be?
After the worst happens at Guantanamo, the warden tries to explain it to the outside world - and to himself.
One reporter has been covering Guantanamo since the day the prison opened. The military would like her to go home now.
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The criminal case against the men accused of planning the Sept. 11 attacks is the one aspect of Guantanamo that would seem to make sense - until you start watching it.