Questions remain about Bergdahl's case. First, people with him during Coast Guard boot camp did not understand how could have enlisted in the Army, given their graphic recollections of his breakdown, which was not a "garden variety panic attack". Gen. Kenneth Dahl wrote that Bergdahl's Coast Guard separation should have been examined more closely. Koenig summarizes: the Army messed up, Bergdahl messed up walking off base, and then there were 5 years with the Taliban. But that leaves out the reckoning desired by the military. They want an accounting. What was Bergdahl's fault, and what was not? Gen. Michael Flynn, formerly head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, says authoritatively people died on missions to find Bergdahl. But the evidence is not so clear, in spite of the six names from the 501st battalion on missions to find DUSTWUN that have been cited in the media. Other soldiers in his unit were convinced that finding Bergdahl was part of all their missions following his disappearance, so the six deaths were connected to Bergdahl. Some cited resources dedicated to finding him that were not then available to other operations. Sgt. Maj. Ken Wolfe, however, advised looking "at a map and a timeframe", meaning after 45+ days, Bergdahl was in Pakistan. No infantry unit would be deployed to look for Bergdahl, as it would have required special forces. But what about second- and third-order consequences of his desertion? Wolfe dispels these arguments as "speculation and hypothetical". Perhaps the mission to find Bergdahl was just top cover to justify other unrelated missions the Army units needed to accomplish, as an excuse to gain assets and permission to "get outside the wire". Flynn points out they did not have bullet-proof intelligence on where Bergdahl was. But resources were diverted and people were injured and suffered because of looking for Bergdahl. Who is to blame for variables causing the deaths and injuries in wars? The country signed up for all the things a